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Abstract
We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information about
their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference games. Each
wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available bandwidth to maximize
its data rate (measured via Shannon capacity), which requires mitigating the effect of
interference caused by other devices. Such competitive models represent situations in
which several wireless devices share spectrum without any central authority or coordi-
nated protocol.
In contrast to games where devices have complete information about their oppo-
nents, we consider scenarios where the devices are unaware of the interference they
cause to other devices. Such games, which are modeled as Bayesian games, can ex-
hibit significantly different equilibria. We first consider a simple scenario where the
devices select their power profile simultaneously. In such simultaneous move games,
we show that the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is where both devices spread their
power equally across the entire bandwidth. We then extend this model to a two-tiered
spectrum sharing case where users act sequentially. Here one of the devices, called the
primary user, is the owner of the spectrum and it selects its power profile first. The
second device (called the secondary user) then responds by choosing a power profile
to maximize its Shannon capacity. In such sequential move games, we show that there
exist equilibria in which the primary user obtains a higher data rate by using only a
part of the bandwidth.
∗This project was supported by the Stanford Clean Slate Internet Program and by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency under the Information Theory for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (ITMANET) Program.
The authors are with Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305.
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In a repeated Bayesian interference game, we show the existence of reputation effects:
an informed primary user can “bluff” to prevent spectrum usage by a secondary user
who suffers from lack of information about the channel gains. The resulting equilib-
rium can be highly inefficient, suggesting that competitive spectrum sharing is highly
suboptimal. This observation points to the need for some regulatory protocol to attain
a more efficient spectrum sharing solution.
1 Introduction
Our paper is motivated by a scenario where several wireless devices share the same spectrum.
Such scenarios are a common occurrence in unlicensed bands such as the ISM and UNII
bands. In such bands, diverse technologies such as 802.11, Bluetooth, Wireless USB, and
cordless phones compete with each other for the same bandwidth. Usually, these devices
have different objectives, they follow different protocols, and they do not cooperate with each
other. Indeed, although the FCC is considering wider implementation of “open” spectrum
sharing models, one potential undesirable outcome of open spectrum could be a form of the
“tragedy of the commons”: self-interested wireless devices destructively interfere with each
other, and thus eliminate potential benefits of open spectrum.
Non-cooperative game theory offers a natural framework to model such interactions be-
tween competing devices. In [16], the authors studied competition between devices in a
Gaussian noise environment as a Gaussian interference (GI) game. This work was extended
in [2] for the case of spectrum allocation between wireless devices; the authors provided a
non-cooperative game theoretic framework to study issues such as spectral efficiency and
fairness. In [9], the authors derived channel gain regimes where cooperative schemes would
perform better than non-cooperative schemes for the GI game.
The game theoretic models used in these previous works typically assume that the matrix
of channel gains among all users is completely known to the players. This may not be
realistic or practical in many scenarios, as competing technologies typically do not employ a
coordinated information dissemination protocol. Even if information dissemination protocols
were employed, incentive mechanisms would be required in a situation with competitive
devices to ensure that channel states were truthfully exchanged. By contrast, our paper
studies a range of non-cooperative games characterized by the feature that there is incomplete
information about some or all channel gains between devices. Such scenarios are captured
through static and dynamic Bayesian games [3].
We consider a simplistic model where two transmitter-receiver (TX-RX) pairs, or “users”,
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share a single band divided into K subchannels.1 We assume both users face a total power
constraint, and that the noise floor is identical across subchannels. We further assume that
channel gains are drawn from a fixed distribution that is common knowledge to the users.
We make the simplifying assumption of flat fading, i.e., constant gains across subchannels,
to develop the model. A user’s strategic decision consists of an allocation of power across the
available subchannels to maximize the available data rate (measured via Shannon capacity).
In Section 2 we consider a simultaneous-move game between the devices under this model.
We study two scenarios: first, a game where all channel gains are unknown to both users;
and second, a game where a user knows the gain between its own TX-RX pair as well as the
interference power gain from the other transmitter at its own receiver (also called incident
channel gains), but it does not know the channel gain between the TX-RX pair of the other
user or the interference it causes to the other receiver. In these two scenarios, we show that
there exists a unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium2, where both users equally spread
their power over the band (regardless of the channel gains observed). In this equilibrium, the
actions played after channel gains are realized are also a Nash equilibrium of the complete
information game.
While simultaneous-move games are a good model for competition between devices with
equal priority to shared resources, they are not appropriate for a setting where one device is a
natural incumbent, such as primary/secondary device competition. In such two-tiered mod-
els for spectrum sharing, some radio bands may be allocated to both primary and secondary
users. The primary users have priority over the secondary users and we use game theory
to analyze competition in such scenarios. In Section 3, we consider a two-stage sequential
Bayesian game where one device (the primary) moves before the other (the secondary); we
find that asymmetric equilibria can be sustained where the devices sometimes operate in
disjoint subchannels (called “sharing” the bandwidth), provided interference between them
is sufficiently large. We also add an entry stage to the game, where the secondary device
decides whether or not it wants to operate in the primary’s band in the first place; we also
characterize Nash equilibria of this game in terms of the distribution of the incident channel
gains.
In Section 4, we use the sequential Bayesian game with entry to study repeated interaction
between a primary and secondary user. We consider a model where a secondary user repeat-
edly polls a primary user’s band to determine if it is worthwhile to enter. Using techniques
1Throughout this paper, a transmitter-receiver pair is identified with a particular user.
2Here “symmetric” means that both users’ strategies are identical functions of their channel gain. Asym-
metric equilibria, where users may have different functional form of their strategies, are harder to justify, as
they would require prior coordination among the devices to “agree” on which equilibrium is played.
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pioneered in the economics literature on reputation effects [10], we show the existence of a
sequential equilibrium where the primary user exploits the secondary user’s lack of channel
knowledge to its own advantage; in particular, we show that by threatening to aggressively
spread power against the secondary, the primary can deter the secondary from entering at
all. (See footnote 4 for the definition of sequential equilibrium.) In a complete information
game, the secondary user knows that the best response of the primary user to an entry by
the secondary user is to share the bandwidth. Thus, the primary user’s threat of aggressively
spreading power would not be credible in such scenarios. Our result suggests that, in the
absence of regulation, primary devices may inflate their power profile to “scare” secondary
devices away, even if such behavior is suboptimal for the primary in the short term.
We conclude by noting that game theoretic models have also been used in the design
of power control and spectrum sharing schemes. A market-based power control mechanism
for wireless data networks was discussed in [13]. In [1], the authors model a power control
mechanism as a supermodular game and prove several convergence properties. Supermodu-
larity was also employed to describe a distributed power control mechanism in [5]; this latter
paper also contains insights regarding supermodularity of the GI game. Another approach to
spectrum sharing is to consider real time “auctions”’ of the channels as described in [4, 14].
By contrast, our paper studies a setting where no coordination mechanism exists, and the
devices are completely competitive; hence we do not follow this approach.
2 Static Gaussian Interference Games
In this section we consider a range of static game-theoretic models for competition between
two devices. In other words, in all the models we consider, both devices simultaneously
choose their actions, and then payoffs are realized. We start in Section 2.1 by defining the
model we consider, an interference model with two users. In Section 2.2 we define a Bayesian
game where both users do not know any of the channel gains. However, this model is not
necessarily realistic; in many scenarios information is asymmetric: a device may know its
own incident channel gains, but not those incident on the other devices. Thus in Section
2.3, we introduce a “partial” Bayesian game (where the users know their own channel gain
as well as the received interference gain), and study its equilibria.
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2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a two user Gaussian interference model (see Figure 1) with K subchannels; in
each subchannel k = 1, . . . , K, the model is:
yi[n] =
2∑
j=1
hkjixj [n] + wi[n], i = 1, 2, (1)
where xi[n] and yi[n] are user i’s input and output symbols at time n, respectively. Here
hkij is the channel gain from the transmitter of user i to the receiver of user j in subchannel
k. We assume that the system exhibits flat fading, i.e., the channel gains hkij = hij for all
k = 1, . . . , K. The noise processes w1[n] and w2[n] are assumed to be independent of each
other, and are i.i.d over time with wi[n] ∼ N (0, N0), where N0 is the noise power spectral
density.
Each user has an average power constraint of P . We assume that each user treats
interference as noise and that no interference cancellation techniques are used. Denote by
Pik the transmission power of user i in channel k. Let Pi = (Pi1, . . . , PiK), and P = (P1,P2).
We will frequently use the notation “−i” to denote the player other than i (i.e., player 1
if i = 2, and player 2 if i = 1). The utility Πi(P) of user i is the Shannon capacity data
rate limit for the user. Under the above assumptions, given a power vector P, the Shannon
capacity limit of a user i over all K subchannels is given as:
Πi(P) =
K∑
k=1
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiPik
N0 + g−i,iPik
)]
. (2)
Here gij is the interference gain between the transmitter of user i and the receiver of user
j, and is defined as gij = |hij |2; we let g = (g11, g12, g21, g22) denote the channel gain vector.
Note that for each i, the power allocation must satisfy the constraint
∑
k Pik ≤ P . In
particular, both users share the same power constraint.
In the complete information Gaussian interference (GI) game, each user i chooses a power
allocation Pi to maximize the utility Πi(Pi,P−i) subject to the total power constraint, given
the power allocation P−i of the opponent. Both users carry out this maximization with full
knowledge of the channel gains g, the noise level N0, and the power limit P . A Nash equilib-
rium (NE) of this game is a power vector P where both users have simultaneously maximized
payoffs. This interference game has been analyzed previously in the literature, and in partic-
ular existence and conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium have been developed in [2,16].
In this paper, we take a different approach: we consider the same game, but assume some
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or all of the channel gains are unknown to the players. In the next two sections, we introduce
two variations on this game.
2.2 The Gaussian Interference Game with Unknown Channel Gains
We begin by considering the GI game, but where neither player has knowledge of the channel
gains gij; we refer to this as the unknown channel GI (UC-GI) game. Our motivation is the
fast-fading scenario where the channel gains change rapidly relative to the transmission
strategy decision. This makes the channel gain feedback computationally expensive and
generally inaccurate.
We assume that the channel gains g are drawn from a distribution F , with continuous
density f on a compact subset G ⊂ {g : gij > 0 ∀ i, j}, and we assume that both players do
not observe the channel gains. For simplicity, we assume that F factors so that (g11, g21) is
independent of (g22, g12).
We assume that both players now maximize expected utility, given the power allocation
of their opponent; i.e., given P−i, player i chooses Pi to maximize E[Πi(Pi,P−i)], subject
to the power constraint (the expectation is taken over the distribution F ). A NE of the
UC-GI game is thus a power vector where both players have simultaneously maximized their
expected payoffs.
We focus our attention on the case of symmetric NE, i.e., where both players use the same
strategy. It is possible that there may exist several asymmetric equilibria, but for the users to
operate at any one of those equilibria would require some form of prior coordination. Since
the users in this game do not coordinate, it is reasonable to search for symmetric equilibrium.
The next theorem shows that if K = 2, the UC-GI game has a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. For the UC-GI game with K = 2 subchannels, there exists a unique symmetric
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, regardless of the channel distribution F , where the users
spread their power equally over the entire band; i.e, the unique NE is P ∗11 = P
∗
12 = P
∗
21 =
P ∗22 = P/2.
Proof. Note that if P∗ is a NE, then (substituting the power constraint) we conclude P ∗i1 is
a solution of the following maximization problem:
max
Pi1
∫
G
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiPi1
N0 + g−i,iP−i,1
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
gii(P − Pi1)
N0 + g−i,i(P − P−i,1)
)]
f(g) dg.
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Since log(1+x) is strictly concave in x, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient
to identify a NE. Differentiating and simplifying yields:
∫
G
gii
2
(
gii(P − 2Pi1) + g−i,i(P − 2P−i,1)
(N0 + giiPi1 + g−i,iP−i,1)(N0 + gii(P − Pi1 + g−i,i(P − P−i,1)))
)
f(g) dg = 0.
Note that the denominator in the integral above is always positive; and further, gii > 0
on G. Thus in a NE, if Pi1 > P/2, then we must have P−i,1 < P/2 (and vice versa). Thus
the only symmetric NE occur where Pi1 = P−i,1 = P/2, as required.
While our result is framed with only two subchannels, the same argument can be easily
extended to the case of multiple subchannels via induction.
Corollary 1. Consider the UC-GI game with K > 1 subchannels. There exists a unique
symmetric NE, where the two users spread their power equally over all K subchannels.
Proof. The proof follows from an inductive argument; clearly the result holds if K = 2.
Let PK be a symmetric NE with K subchannels. Let S ⊂ {1, . . . , K} be a subset of the
subchannels. Since the NE is symmetric, let QS =
∑
k∈S P
K
ik ; this is the total power the
players use in the subchannels of S. It is clear that if we restrict the power vector PK to
only the subchannels in S, then the resulting power vector must be a symmetric NE for the
UC-GI game over only these subchannels, with total power constraint QK−1. Since this holds
for every subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , K} of size |S| ≤ K − 1, we can apply the inductive hypothesis
to conclude every user allocates equal power to each subchannel in the equilibrium PK , as
required.
While we have only shown uniqueness among symmetric NE in the preceding results,
we conjecture that in fact the only pure NE of the UC-GI game is one where all players
use equal transmit power in every subchannel. Our conjecture is motivated by numerical
results using best response dynamics for the UC-GI game; these are dynamics where at each
time step, each player plays a best response to the action of his opponent at the previous
time step. As we see in Figure 2, even if the users initially transmit at different powers in
each subchannel, the best response dynamics converge to the symmetric NE. In fact, for this
numerical example the best response dynamics verify uniqueness of the pure NE.3
3For the UC-GI game, one can infer that for the numerical example with K = 2, the unique pure NE
is the symmetric NE where all users spread their power across the subchannels. To justify this claim, note
that the UC-GI game is a supermodular game, if the strategy spaces are appropriately defined. (A complete
overview of supermodular games is beyond the scope of this paper; for background on supermodular games,
see [5, 15].) In particular, let s1 = P11, and let s2 = −P21, with strategy spaces S1 = [0, P ], S2 = [−P, 0].
Define Vi(s1, s2) = Πi(s1, P − s1,−s2, P + s2). Then it can be easily shown that Vi has increasing differences
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2.3 Bayesian Gaussian Interference Game
In the UC-GI game defined above, we assume that each user is unaware of all the channel
gains. However in a slowly changing environment, it is common for the receiver to feed back
channel gain information to the transmitter. Thus, in this section we assume that each user
i is aware of the self channel gain gii, and the incident channel gain g−i,i; for notational
simplicity, let gi = (gii, g−i,i). However, because of the difficulties involved in dissemination
of channel state information from other devices, we continue to assume that each user is
unaware of the channel gains of the other users. In particular, this means user i does not
know the value g
−i. In this game, each player chooses Pi to maximize E[Πi(Pi,P−i)|gi],
subject to the power constraint; note that now the expectation is conditioned on gi. The
power allocation P−i is random, since it depends on the channel gains of player −i—which
are unknown to player i. Thus this is a Bayesian game, in which a strategy of player i is a
family of functions si(gi) = (si1(gi), . . . , siK(gi)), where sik(gi) gives the power allocation of
player i in subchannel k when gains gi are realized. We refer to this game as the Bayesian
Gaussian interference (BGI) game. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium BNE is a strategy vector
(s1(·), s2(·)) such that for each i and each gi, player i has maximized his expected payoff
given the strategy of the opponent:
si(gi) ∈ argmax
Pi
E[Πi(Pi, s−i(g−i))|gi].
For the BGI game, we again want to investigate symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria. How-
ever, in principle the functional strategic form of a player can be quite complex. Thus, for
analytical tractability, we focus our attention on a restricted class of possible actions: we
allow users to either put their entire power in a single subchannel, or split their power evenly
across all subchannels. This is a practical subclass of actions which allows us to explore
whether asymmetric equilibria can exist.
Formally, the action space of both players is now restricted to S = {Pe1, . . . , PeK , P1/K};
here ei is the standard basis vector with all zero entries except a “1” in the i’th position,
and 1 is a vector where every entry is “1”. Thus Pek is the action that places all power
in subchannel k, while P1/K spreads power equally across all subchannels. A strategy for
player i is a map that chooses, for each realization of (gii, g−i,i), an action in S.
in si and s−i. This suffices to ensure that there exists a “largest” NE s, and a “smallest” NE s, that
are, respectively, the least upper bound and greatest lower bound to the set of NE in the product lattice
S1 × S2 [12]. Further, best response dynamics initiated at the smallest strategy vector (s1, s2) = (0,−P )
converge to s; and best response dynamics initiated at the largest strategy vector (s1, s2) = (P, 0) converge
to s [12]. Thus if these two best response dynamics converge to the same strategy vector, there must be a
unique pure NE.
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Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that (g11, g21) and (g22, g12) are i.i.d. Then the unique pure strategy
symmetric BNE of the BGI game is where both users choose action P1/K, i.e., they spread
their power equally across bands.
Proof. Fix a symmetric BNE (s1, s2) where s1k(·) = s2k(·) = s
k(·) is the common strategy
used by both players; i.e., given channel gains gi, player i puts power s
k(gi) in subchannel
k. Define αk = P(sk(gi) = Pek) for each subchannel k; and γ = P(s
k(gi) = P1/K). These
are the probabilities that a player transmits with full power in subchannel k, or with equal
power in all subchannels, respectively.
Let Πi(Pi; gi) be the expected payoff of user 1 if it uses action Pi ∈ S, given that the
other player is using the equilibrium strategy profile (s1, . . . , sK) and the channel gains are
gi. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For two subchannels k, k′, if αk < αk′, then Πi(Pek; gi) > Πi(Pek′; gi) for all
values of gi; i.e., player i strictly prefers to put full power into subchannel k over putting full
power into subchannel k′.
Proof of Lemma. Using (2) we can write Πi(Pek; gi) as:
Πi(Pek; gi) =
αk
2
[
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0 + g−i,iP
)]
+
γ
2
[
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0 + g−i,iP/B
)]
+
1− αk − γ
2
[
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0
)]
.
Define ∆ as:
∆ ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0 + g−i,iP
)
> 0,
since we have assumed g−i,i > 0. Rearranging and simplifying, we have that Πi(Pek; gi) −
Πi(Pek′; gi) = ∆ (αk′ − αk) . Since ∆ > 0 and αk′ > αk, the lemma is proved. 
The previous lemma ensures that in a symmetric equilibrium we cannot have αk < αk′
for any two subchannels k, k′: in this case, αk′ > 0, so the equilibrium strategy puts positive
weight on action Pek′; but player i’s best response to this strategy puts zero weight on Pek′
(from the lemma).
Thus in a symmetric equilibrium we must have αk = αk′ for all subchannels k, k
′; i.e.,
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αk = (1−γ)/K for all k. Define α = (1−γ)/K. In this case we have for each subchannel k:
Πi(Pek; gi) =α
[
K − 1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0 + g−i,iP
)]
+ γ
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP
N0 + g−i,iP/K
)]
,
and
Πi(P1/K) =(1− γ)
[
K − 1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP/K
N0
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
giiP/K
N0 + g−i,iP
)]
+ γ
[
K
2
log
(
1 +
giiP/K
N0 + g−i,iP/K
)]
.
Since log(1+x) is a strictly concave function of x, we get that K log(1+ x
K
) > log(1+x) for
x > 0. Since α = (1 − γ)/2, this implies that Πi(P1/K) > Πi(Pek) for all subchannels k.
Thus in a symmetric equilibrium, we must have α = 0; i.e., the unique symmetric equilibrium
occurs where γ = 1, so both users equally spread their power across all subchannels.
Thus far we have considered games where players act simultaneously. However in several
practical cases, one of the players may already be using the spectrum when another user
wants to enter the same band. We model such scenarios as sequential games in the next
section.
3 Sequential Interference Games with Incomplete In-
formation
In this section, we study sequential games between wireless devices with incomplete informa-
tion. In such games, player 1, who we refer to as the primary user, determines its transmis-
sion strategy before player 2. Player 2, also referred to as the secondary user, observes the
action of the primary user and chooses a transmission strategy that is a best response. We
study this model in Section 3.1. While we focused on symmetric equilibria of static games
in the preceding section, we focus here on the fact that sequential games naturally allow the
users to sustain asymmetric equilibrium. We characterize how these equilibria depend on
the realized channel gains of the users.
Such games are a natural approach to study dynamic spectrum sharing between cognitive
radios. The primary user is the incumbent user of the band, while the secondary user
represents a potential new device that also wishes to use spectrum in the band. In particular,
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in this model we must also study whether the secondary device would find it profitable
to compete with the primary in the first place. In Section 3.2, we extend this game to
incorporate an entry decision by the secondary user, and again study dependence of the
equilibria on realized channel gains.
3.1 A Two-Stage Sequential Game
In this section, we consider a two-stage sequential Bayesian Gaussian interference (SBGI)
game; we restrict attention to two subchannels for simplicity. Player 1 (the primary) moves
first, and Player 2 (the secondary) perfectly observes the action of the primary user before
choosing its own action. We assume that each of the self gains gii (in the interference channel
given in (1)) are normalized to 1; this is merely done to isolate and understand the effects
of interference on the interaction between devices, and does not significantly constrain the
results.
As before, the channel gains are randomly selected. For the remainder of this section, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Player 1 (the primary user) knows both g12 and g21, while the secondary
user only knows g12 (but not g21).
Thus the primary user knows the interference it causes to the secondary user; the sec-
ondary user however, is only aware of its own incident channel gain. This approach allows
us to focus on the secondary user’s uncertainty; it is also possible to analyze the same game
when the primary user does not know g12 (see appendix).
As before, we restrict the action space of each user to either use only one of the sub-
channels, or to spread power equally in both subchannels. We assume that if the primary
concentrates power in a single subchannel, it chooses subchannel 1; this is done without loss
of generality, since fading is flat, and the primary moves first. If the primary user chooses
to place its entire power in subchannel 1, then from Lemma 3, we know that the secondary
user’s best response puts zero weight on this action: the secondary user will either spread
over both subchannels, or put its entire power in the free subchannel. Thus concentrating
power in a single subchannel is tantamount to sharing a single subchannel with the secondary.
Thus we say the primary “shares” if it concentrates all its power in a single subchannel, and
denote this action by SH . We use SP to denote the action where the primary spreads its
power across both subchannels. We also use the same notation to denote the actions of the
secondary: concentrating power in a single subchannel (in this case, subchannel 2) is denoted
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by SH , and spreading is denoted by SP . The game tree for the SBGI game is shown in
Figure 3.
We solve for the equilibrium path in the sequential game using backward induction.
Once channel gains are realized, suppose that the primary player chooses the action SP .
Conditioned on this action by the primary player, the secondary player chooses the action
SP if
log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g12P/2
)
>
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0 + g12P/2
)
. (3)
Since log(1 + x) is a strictly concave function of x, the above inequality holds for all values
of g12. Thus the best response of the secondary user is to choose SP whenever the primary
user chooses SP , regardless of the value of g12.
The situation is more interesting if the primary user decides to share the bandwidth, i.e.,
chooses action SH . Given this action of the primary user, the secondary user would prefer
to spread its power if and only if:
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
2N0
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g12P
)
>
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
⇐⇒ g12 <
1
2
. (4)
Thus if g12 < 1/2, the secondary will choose SP in response to SH . On the other hand,
if g12 > 1/2, the secondary user will choose SH in response to SH . (We ignore g12 = 1/2
since channel gains have continuous densities.) We summarize our observations in the next
lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. In the SBGI game, if the primary user chooses
SP in the first stage, the best response of the secondary is SP ; if the primary chooses SH in
the first stage, the best response of the secondary is SH if g12 > 1/2, and SP if g12 < 1/2.
Thus in equilibrium, regardless of the channel gains, either both users share or both users
spread. Suppose the secondary plays SP regardless of the primary’s action; in this case SP
is also the best action for the primary. Thus if g12 < 1/2, the primary user will never choose
SH in the first stage. On the other hand, when g12 > 1/2, it can choose its optimal action
by comparing the payoff when both players choose SP to the payoff when both players choose
SH . In this case, the primary user would prefer to spread its power if and only if:
log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g21P/2
)
>
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
, ⇐⇒ g21 <
1√
1 + P/N0 − 1
−
2N0
P
, g∗.
(5)
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Observe that this threshold approaches zero as P/N0 → ∞, and 1/2 as P/N0 → 0. (In
fact, the threshold is a decreasing function of P/N0.) Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. In the sequential equilibria of the game,4 if
g12 > 1/2 and g21 > g
∗, the primary user chooses SH; if g12 < 1/2 or g21 < g
∗, the primary
user chooses SP . The secondary user plays the same action as that chosen by the primary,
regardless of the realized channel gain. The value of g∗ is given in (5).
Since in equilibrium, either both users share or both users spread, for later reference we
make the following definitions:
Πsharei =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
; Πspreadi = log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g−i,iP/2
)
. (6)
These are the payoffs to user i if both users play SH , or both play SP , respectively. Note
that Πspreadi depends on g−i,i, and is thus stochastic.
3.2 A Sequential Game with Entry
In this section, we modify the game of the last section to incorporate an entry decision by
the secondary user; we refer to this as the sequential Bayesian Gaussian interference game
with entry (SBGI-E). Specifically, at the beginning of the game, the secondary user decides
to either enter the system (this action is denoted by N) or stay out of the system (denoted by
X). If the secondary user decides to exit, the primary user has no action to take. If however,
the secondary user enters the system, the two users play the same game as described in the
previous section. The game tree of the SBGI-E game is shown in Figure 3.
If the secondary user exits the game, its payoff (defined as the maximum data rate
received) is 0. However, if the secondary user enters the game, the payoff to the user is
always positive, regardless of the action taken by the primary user and the channel gains.
Thus, in the absence of any further assumption, the model trivially reduces to the one
4Sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for dynamic games of incomplete information [8].
Sequential equilibrium consists of two elements for each user: a history- and type-dependent strategy, as well
as a conditional distribution (or belief) over the unknown types of other players given history. Two conditions
must be satisfied; first, for each player, the strategy maximizes expected payoff over the remainder of the
game (i.e., the strategy is sequentially rational). Second, the beliefs are consistent: players compare observed
history to the equilibrium strategies, and use Bayesian updating to specify their conditional distribution over
other players’ types. The precise definition is somewhat more involved, and beyond the scope of this paper.
In our scenario, the primary knows g12, and thus has no uncertainty. The secondary user’s belief of the
value of g21 is updated at the second stage on the basis of the primary’s action at the first stage; however,
since the secondary user’s action does not depend on the value of g21, we do not specify beliefs in the
statement of the proposition.
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studied in the previous section. To make the model richer, we introduce a cost of power
to the overall payoff of the secondary user.5 This cost of power can represent, for example,
battery constraints of the wireless device. We assume that if the secondary enters, a cost kP
is incurred (where k is a proportionality constant). With this cost of power, if the secondary
user enters it obtains payoff Πˆ2(P1,P2) = Π2(P1,P2) − kP . Note that if the secondary
user exits the game, it gets no rate with no cost of power; in this case its payoff is zero.
Furthermore, from Proposition 1, we know that if the secondary user enters in equilibrium,
it will obtain either Πshare2 − kP or Π
spread
2 − kP . Thus, to decide between entry and exit,
the secondary user compares these quantities to zero. In the case where g12 < 1/2, we easily
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and that g12 < 1/2. In the sequential equilib-
rium of the SBGI-E game, the secondary player always enters if Πspread2 > kP and it always
exits if Πspread2 < kP .
Proof. The proof follows trivially from Theorem 1 since if g12 < 1/2, both the primary and
the secondary user spread their powers after entry.
Let us now consider the case when g12 > 1/2. Since the game is symmetric, we conclude
that Πshare2 > Π
spread
2 if and only if g12 > g
∗. A straightforward calculation using the ex-
pression in (5) establishes that g∗ < 1/2. Thus if g12 > 1/2, then g12 > g
∗; in particular,
for g12 > 1/2, there always holds Π
share
2 > Π
spread
2 . For the sake of simplicity, we make the
following assumption for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 2. The payoff to the secondary user Πshare2 is greater than the cost of power
kP ; i.e., P/N0 > 2
2kP − 1.
We now compare Πspread2 to the cost of power kP . Under Assumption 2, the secondary
user would always enter if Πspread2 > kP . This happens if and only if:
log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g12P/2
)
> kP ⇐⇒ g12 <
1
2kP − 1
−
2N0
P
, g˜12. (7)
Thus if 1/2 < g12 < g˜12, the secondary user always enters. Note that g˜12 → −∞ if N0 →∞,
for fixed P . For fixed N0, we have g˜12 → 0 as P → ∞; and a straightforward calculation6
5This cost of power can also be introduced for the primary user without changing any results mentioned
in this paper. We avoid this for the sake of simplicity.
6To see this, let c = 2kN0 ln 2 and x = P/(2N0), and note that:
g˜12 =
1
ecx − 1
−
1
x
.
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shows that:
lim
P→0
g˜12 =


∞, if 2kN0 ln 2 < 1;
−∞, if 2kN0 ln 2 > 1;
−1/2, if 2kN0 ln 2 = 1.
In particular, g˜12 can take any real value depending on the parameters of the game.
If g12 > g˜12, then Π
spread
2 < kP < Π
share
2 , so the secondary would only enter if the
primary user shares the channel. Let ρ = P(g21 < g∗) be the probability that the primary
user spreads the power. Then the expected payoff of the secondary user on entry is Π2 =
ρΠspread2 +(1−ρ)Π
share
2 −kP . The secondary user would enter if its expected payoff is positive.
This happens if and only if:
ρ <
Πshare2 − kP
Πshare2 − Π
spread
2
, d. (8)
The equilibria of the SBGI-E for g12 > 1/2 are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that g12 > 1/2. Define d as in
(8), and ρ = P(g21 < g∗). Then in the sequential equilibrium of the game, if g12 < g˜12, the
secondary user always enters the game; if however g12 > g˜12 the secondary user enters the
game if ρ < d, and it exits the game if ρ > d. Upon entry the primary and the secondary
user follow the sequential equilibrium of the SBGI game as given in Proposition 1.
4 Repeated Games with Entry: The Reputation Effect
In this section, we study repeated interactions between wireless devices with incomplete
information about their opponents. We consider a finite horizon repeated game, where in
each period the primary and secondary users play the SBGI-E game studied in the previous
section. Consider, for example, a single secondary device considering “entering” one of
several distinct bands, each owned by a different primary. The secondary is likely to poll the
respective bands of the primaries, probing to see if entering the band is likely to yield a high
data rate. Each time the secondary probes a single primary user’s band, it effectively decides
whether to enter or exit; we model each such stage as the SBGI-E game of the preceding
section.
For analytical simplicity, we assume that the secondary user is myopic; i.e., it tries to
maximize its single period payoff. The primary user acts to maximize its total (undiscounted)
Note that ecx = 1 + cx + c2x2/2 + e(x), where e(x) = o(x2). The result follows by substituting this Taylor
expansion in the above expression for g˜12, and considering the cases c < 1, c > 1, and c = 1, respectively.
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payoff over the entire horizon. Even though the secondary user is myopic, it has perfect recall
of the actions taken by both the primary and the secondary user in previous periods of the
game. We find that this model can be studied using seminal results from the economic
literature on reputation effects; in particular, our main insight is that the primary may
choose to spread power against an entering secondary, even if it is not profitable in a single
period to do so—the goal being to “scare” the secondary into never entering again. We first
describe our repeated game model in section 4.1. Then, in section 4.2, we analyze sequential
equilibria for such games.
4.1 A Repeated SBGI-E Game
We first assume that at the beginning of the repeated game, nature chooses (independent)
cross channel gains g12 and g21 from a known common prior distribution F , and these chan-
nel gains stay constant for the entire duration of the game. As in the preceding section,
we assume g11 = g22 = 1, to isolate the effect of interference. We continue to make the
assumption (for technical simplicity) that the secondary user is not aware of g21, while the
primary user knows the value of g12; insights for the case where the primary does not know
g12 are offered in the appendixAs before, the channel gains determine the data rate obtained
by each user.
We assume that the primary and the secondary user play the same SBGI-E game in
each period; i.e., each period the secondary decides whether to enter or exit. Because
the secondary player is assumed to be myopic, once the secondary player enters the game
its best response to the primary user’s action is uniquely defined by Proposition 1. In
particular, post-entry, the best response of the secondary is identical to the action taken by
the primary—regardless of the channel gains. Thus, we can reduce the three-stage SBGI-E
game into a two-stage SBGI-E game. In the first stage of this reduced game, the secondary
user chooses either N (enter) or X (exit). If the secondary user enters, then in the second
stage, the primary user chooses either SH (share) or SP (spread). The payoffs of the players
are then realized, using the fact that the post-entry action of the secondary user is same as
the action of the primary user.
We let (a1,t, a2,t) denote the actions chosen by the two players at each time period t. If
the secondary exits, then the primary is always strictly better off spreading power across
subchannels instead of concentrating in a single subchannel. Thus a2,t = X is never fol-
lowed by a1,t = SH in equilibrium, so without loss of generality we assume (a1,t, a2,t) ∈
{(SP,X), (SH,N), (SP,N)}.
We assume both users have perfect recall of the actions taken by the users in previous peri-
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ods. Let hi,t denote the history recalled by player i in period t. Then, h1,t = (a1, · · ·at−1, a2,t)
and h2,t = (a1, · · ·at−1) (since the primary observes the entry decision of the secondary before
moving). The strategy si(hi,t) of a user i is a probability distribution over available actions
({X,N} for the secondary user, and {SH, SP} for the primary user). Note in particular
that in this section we allow mixed strategies for both players.
By a slight abuse of notation, let Πi(at) denote the payoff of player i in period t. For the
primary user, the payoff in each period is the maximum data rate it gets in that period, and
its objective is to maximize the total payoff
∑T
t=1Π1(at). Here T is the length of the horizon
for the repeated game. In each period t, let Π0 be the payoff obtained by the primary user
if the secondary user exits; then Π0 = Π1(SP,X) = log
(
1 + P
2N0
)
. As before, we do not
assume a cost of power for the primary user; this does not affect the results presented in this
section. On the other hand, the secondary user is considered to be myopic: its objective is
to maximize its one period payoff. If the secondary user decides to exit the game, it obtains
zero rate with no cost of power, so Π2(SP,X) = 0.
The per-period payoffs of the primary player and the secondary player are thus given as:
Π1(at) =


Π0, if at = (SP,X)
Πshare1 , if at = (SH,N)
Πspread1 , if at = (SP,N);
Π2(at) =


0, if at = (SP,X)
Πshare2 − kP, if at = (SH,N)
Πspread2 − kP, if at = (SP,N).
(9)
Here Πsharei and Π
spread
i are defined in (6). Since Π
spread
i may be stochastic, Πi(at) may be
stochastic as well.
4.2 Sequential Equilibrium of the Repeated Game
In this section we study sequential equilibria of the repeated SBGI-E game. Note that
all exogenous parameters are known by the primary under Assumption 1. However, the
secondary does not know the channel gain g21 of the primary, and instead maintains a
conditional distribution, or belief, of the value of g21 given the observed history h2,t. The
secondary user updates his beliefs in a Bayesian manner as the history evolves (see footnote
4).
As shown in Proposition 3, if g12 < g˜12 for the single period SBGI-E game, the secondary
user’s entry decision depends only on its realized channel gain g12 and the cost of power. It
follows that regardless of the secondary’s beliefs, if g12 < g˜12 the secondary user either enters
in every period or it stays out in every period; i.e., its strategy is independent of history.
Thus, in the sequential equilibrium of the repeated game, each period follows the sequential
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equilibrium of the single period game (cf. Proposition 3).
More interesting behavior arises if g12 > g˜12. In this case, from Proposition 3, the
secondary user prefers to enter if there is high probability the subchannels will be shared by
the primary, and prefers to exit otherwise. Since the primary’s action depends on its gain
g21, in this case we must calculate the secondary user’s conditional distribution of g21 after
each history h2,t. Belief updating can lead to significant analytical complexity, as the belief
is infinite-dimensional (a distribution over a continuous space).
However, the result of Proposition 3 suggests perhaps some reduction may be possible: as
noted there, the secondary’s action only depends on its belief about whether g21 is larger or
smaller than g∗, which can be reduced to a scalar probability. If we can exhibit a sequential
equilibrium of the repeated game in which the primary’s action only depends on whether g21
is larger or smaller than g∗ as well, then we can represent the secondary’s belief by a scalar
sufficient statistic, namely the probability that g21 is larger than g
∗.
Remarkably, we show that precisely such a reduction is possible, by exhibiting a sequential
equilibrium with the desired property. Define µ2,t(h2,t) = P(g21 < g∗21|h2,t) . We exhibit a
sequential equilibrium where (1) the entry decision of the secondary user in period t is based
only on this probability; and (2) the primary’s strategy is entirely determined by whether
g21 is larger or smaller than g
∗. In this equilibrium µt will be a sufficient statistic for the
history of the play until time t.
The equilibrium we exhibit has the property that the primary user can exploit the lack
of knowledge of the secondary user. To illustrate this point, consider a simplistic 2 period
game. Assume that g21 > g
∗, so that in a single period game the primary prefers SH to
SP after entry by the secondary. If the secondary enters in the first period and the primary
plays SP (spread), the secondary may mistakenly believe g21 to be small—and thus expect
its payoff to be negative in the second period as well, and hence not enter. The primary
thus obtains total payoff Πspread1 + Π0. By contrast, if the primary had shared in the first
period, the secondary would certainly have entered in the second period as well, and in
this case the primary obtains payoff 2Πshare1 . It can be easily shown that if g21 < 1, then
Πspread1 +Π0 > 2Π
share
1 . Thus under such conditions, the primary user can benefit by spreading
even though its single-period payoff is maximized by sharing.
The above example highlights the fact that the secondary user’s lack of information can
be exploited by the primary user for its own advantage. The primary user can masquerade
and build a reputation as an “aggressive” player, thereby preventing entry by the secondary
user. Such “reputation effects”’ were first studied in the economics literature [7, 11], where
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the authors show that the lack of complete information can lead to such effects.7
For the repeated SGI-E game with g12 > g˜12, a sequential equilibrium can be derived using
an analysis closely following [7]. Here (for notational simplicity) the periods are numbered
in reverse numerical order. Thus, T denotes the first chronological period, and 1 the last.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that g12 > g˜12. Also assume that
P(g21 < 1) = 1. Let d be defined as in (8). Then the following actions and the belief update
rule form a sequential equilibrium of the finite horizon repeated SBGI-E game:
1. The secondary user in period t enters the system if µ2,t(h2,t) < d
t, and it exits the
system if µ2,t(h2,t) > d
t. If µ2,t = d
t, the secondary user enters with probability λ, and
exits with probability 1− λ, where:
λ = 2−
Π0 −Π
spread
1
Π0 − Πshare1
.
2. If g21 < g
∗, the primary user always spreads its power. If g21 > g
∗, then after entry
by a secondary user in period t > 1, the primary user always spreads if µt ≥ dt−1, and
otherwise randomizes, with the probability of spreading equal to:
γ =
µt
(1− µt)
(1− dt−1)
dt−1
. (10)
For t = 1, a primary user with g21 > g
∗ always shares.
3. The beliefs µt are updated as follows:
µ2,t(h2,t) =


µ2,t+1(h2,t+1), if at+1 = (X, φ);
max{dt, µ2,t+1(h2,t+1)}, if at+1 = (N, SP ) and µ2,t+1(h2,t+1) > 0;
0, if at+1 = (N, SH) or µ2,t+1(h2,t+1) = 0.
(11)
The proof of the above theorem follows steps similar to those in [7]. An outline of the
proof for T = 2 is given in the appendix. Note that d < 1, so dt increases as the game
progresses (since t = T, . . . , 1). The first period in which the secondary will enter is when
its initial belief ρ = P(g21 < g∗) first falls below dt; thus even if g21 > g∗, entry is deterred
7The lack of information can also be used to sustain desirable equilibria, as shown in the case of the
finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma [6]. For a comprehensive treatment of such reputation effects see [10].
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from T up to (approximately) t∗ = log(ρ)
log(d)
. It is important to note that this never happens in
a complete information game: if the secondary knew g21 > g
∗ it would enter in every time
period, and the primary would always share.
We conclude by noting that it is straightforward to show that equilibria may be inefficient:
for fixed ρ and d, t∗ is constant, so as T increases the number of periods in which entry is
deterred increases without bound. For parameter values where it would have been better to
allow both users to transmit in each period, the resulting equilibrium is clearly inefficient.
5 Conclusion
We have studied distributed resource allocation in wireless systems via static and sequential
Gaussian interference games of incomplete information. Our analysis shows that equilib-
ria of these Bayesian games exhibit significant differences from their complete information
counterparts. In particular, we have shown in two settings that static Gaussian interference
games have a unique, potentially inefficient equilibrium where all users spread their powers.
More dramatically, in repeated sequential games, we have shown that the lack of channel
information can lead to reputation effects. Here the primary user has an incentive to alter
its power profile to keep incoming secondary users from entering the system.
A Sequential Interference Games with Two-Sided Un-
certainty
The model for the two stage sequential Bayesian Gaussian interference (SBGI) game de-
scribed in Section 3.1 assumed that the primary user is aware of the channel gain g12. In this
appendix we analyze the case where both users are aware of only their own incident channel
gains. We refer to this case as two-sided uncertainty. In Section A.1, we analyze a two stage
sequential game analogous to Section 3.1. In Section A.2, we extend this analysis to include
an entry stage as well.
A.1 A Two Stage Sequential Game
As before, we solve for the equilibrium path using backward induction. Whenever the pri-
mary user chooses SP , the best response of the secondary user is to choose SP regardless
of the value of g12; the reasoning is identical to the proof of Lemma 4. Therefore, if the
20
primary user chooses the action SP , its payoff is Πspread1 which is given by
Πspread1 (g21) = log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g21P/2
)
. (12)
(Note that we now explicitly emphasize the dependence of the payoff on the channel gain
g21.)
If the primary user decides to share the bandwidth, i.e., chooses the action SH , then
depending upon the value of g12 the secondary user will choose between share (SH) or spread
(SP ). From Lemma 4 we know that if g12 < 1/2, the secondary user would prefer to spread
its power even though the primary user shares the subchannels. Let κ = P(g12 < 1/2). Since
the primary user is unaware of g12, its expected payoff (denoted by Π
share
1 ) if it shares the
bandwidth is given by
Π
share
1 (g21) =
1− κ
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
+
κ
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0 + g21P/2
)
(13)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the first stage of the SBGI game with two-sided uncertainty, there exists
a threshold gˆ21(κ) > 0 (possibly infinite) such that if g21(κ) < gˆ21, the primary user always
spreads its power, and if g21 > gˆ21(κ), the primary user always shares the subchannels.
Proof. To decide whether to spread or share, the primary user needs to compare Πspread1 (g21)
to Π
share
1 (g21). We begin by establishing that ∆(g21) = Π
spread
1 (g21) − Π
share
1 (g21) is strictly
decreasing in g21. To see this, note that if we define y(g21) = P/(N0 + g21P/2), then
∆′(g21) = y
′(g21)
(
1/2
1 + y(g21)/2
−
κ/2
1 + y(g21)
)
.
Since y′(g21) < 0, and 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, we conclude that ∆′(g21) < 0 for all g21; i.e., ∆(g21) is
strictly decreasing in g21, as required.
When g21 = 0, we have:
Π
share
1 (0) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
;
Πspread1 (0) = log
(
1 +
P
2N0
)
.
Since log(1 + x) is a strictly concave function of x, Πspread1 (0) > Π
share
1 (0). However, if g21 is
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large, the payoffs to the primary user in the two cases are given by:
lim
g21→∞
Π
share
1 =
1− κ
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
;
lim
g21→∞
Πspread1 = 0.
Thus, limg21→∞Π
share
1 ≥ limg21→∞Π
spread
1 . If κ = 1, then ∆(g21) > 0 for all g21, and thus
user 1 always spreads; i.e., gˆ21(κ) = ∞. Otherwise, there exists a unique finite threshold
gˆ21(κ) > 0 determined by the equation ∆(g21) = 0, as required.
For the secondary user, the best response is to spread the power if the primary user
spreads its power. However, if the primary user decides to share the subchannels, the
secondary user will share if g12 > 1/2; otherwise it spreads its power. This completely
determines the sequential equilibrium for the SBGI game with two-sided uncertainty.
A.2 A Sequential Game with Entry
We now consider the sequential Bayesian Gaussian interference with entry (SBGI-E) game
when both users are only aware of their own incident channel gains; i.e., player i only knows
g−i,i. As before, the secondary user first decides whether to enter or not; if the secondary
user exits, then the primary uses the entire band without competition. If the secondary
enters, then play proceeds as in the SBGI game of the preceding section. Further, if the
secondary chooses to enter, it incurs a cost of power denoted by kP .
To describe a sequential equilibrium for the SBGI-E game with two-sided uncertainty,
we define Π
(share, a)
2 to be the rate of the secondary user when the primary user shares the
subchannels and the secondary user chooses the action a ∈ {SH, SP}. Thus, we have:
Π
(share, share)
2 = Π
share
2 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N0
)
, (14)
Π
(share, spread)
2 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
2N0
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g12P
)
. (15)
We also recall the rate to the secondary user when both users spread their powers, denoted
Πspread2 (cf. (6)):
Πspread2 = log
(
1 +
P/2
N0 + g12P/2
)
.
In this game, we must be particularly careful about how uncertainty affects sequential
decisions. In particular, since the entry decision of the secondary user will depend on the gain
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g12, the primary user learns about the value of g12 from the initial action of the secondary; this
is modeled through the updated belief of the primary user, i.e., its conditional distribution
of g12 given the initial action of the secondary. Post-entry, the play proceeds as in the SBGI
game with two-sided uncertainty considered in the previous section.
The following proposition formally describes sequential equilibria for the SBGI-E game
with two-sided uncertainty; for simplicity, we assume the gain distributions have full support
on (0,∞), but this is unnecessary.
Proposition 5. Assume that the channel gains g12 and g21 have strictly positive densities
on (0,∞). For the sequential Bayesian Gaussian interference game with entry (SBGI-E),
any sequential equilibrium consists of threshold strategies for both the primary and secondary
user; i.e., there exists a threshold gˆ12 such that the secondary user enters if g12 < gˆ12, and
exits if g12 > gˆ12; and post-entry, there exists a κˆ such that the primary user spreads if
g21 < gˆ21(κˆ), and shares if g21 > gˆ21(κˆ) (where gˆ21(·) is the threshold of Proposition 4). In
the third stage, if the primary user spreads its power, the secondary user also spreads its
power regardless of the value of g12. However, if the primary user shares the subchannels,
the secondary user spreads its power if g12 < 1/2 and it shares otherwise.
The belief κˆ is computed using Bayes’ rule:
κˆ =
κP(N | g12 < 1/2)
κP(N | g12 < 1/2) + (1− κ)P(N | g12 > 1/2)
, (16)
where N denotes the “entry” action of the secondary user, and κ = P (g12 < 1/2) (the initial
belief of the primary).
Proof. We first show that in equilibrium, the primary must have a threshold strategy of the
form specified. Note that if the secondary player exits in the first stage, the primary user
has no action to take and the game ends. If the secondary player enters, the primary user
updates its belief about g12 via Bayes’ rule as given in (16), given the entry strategy of the
secondary. Here the probabilities are with respect to the uncertainty in g12.
Now suppose that in equilibrium, the post-entry belief of the primary user is fixed as κˆ.
We consider the entry decision of the secondary user. The secondary user’s decision between
entry or exit depends on the post-entry action taken by the primary user. From Proposition
4, we know that post-entry, the primary user will spread (resp., share) if g21 is less than
(resp., greater than) the threshold gˆ21(κˆ). (Here the threshold gˆ21 depends on the post-entry
belief κˆ of the primary user.) Thus, the decision taken by the secondary user in the first
stage depends on its initial belief α = P(g21 < gˆ21(κˆ)). Since gˆ21(κˆ) > 0 from Proposition 4,
it follows that α > 0.
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After entry, with probability α, the primary user spreads its power; since the best response
of the secondary user to the spreading action by the primary user is to also spread, the payoff
of the secondary user in this case is Πspread2 . With probability 1−α, the primary user shares
the subchannels. Conditioned on the sharing action by the primary user, the secondary user
will spread its power if g12 < 1/2 and will share otherwise. Thus, the expected payoff of the
secondary user upon entry is given by the function h(g12, α), defined as follows:
h(g12, α) =
{
αΠspread2 + (1− α)Π
(share, spread)
2 , if g12 ≤ 1/2,
αΠspread2 + (1− α)Π
(share, share)
2 , if g12 > 1/2.
(17)
It is easy to check that h(g12, α) is continuous; further, for fixed α > 0, h(g12, α) is a
strictly decreasing function of g12. The secondary user will enter if its expected payoff
h(g12, αˆ) is greater than its cost of power kP . If, h(0, α) < kP , let gˆ12 = 0. Similarly, if
limg12→∞ h(g12, α) > kP , we define gˆ12(α) = ∞. Otherwise there exists a unique value of
gˆ12 ∈ (0,∞) with h(gˆ12, α) = kP . Thus, the secondary user will enter if g12 < gˆ12, and exit
if g12 > gˆ12. This concludes the proof.
B Sequential Equilibrium for a Two Period Repeated
Game
In this appendix, for completeness we give an outline of the proof of Theorem 5 for the two
period repeated SBGI-E game with single-sided uncertainty. The arguments given below are
based on those given in [7], and we refer the reader to that paper for details and extensions.
To analyze the two period repeated SBGI-E game, we use backward induction. We
number the periods in reverse numerical order. Thus, period 1 is the last period of the
game, and period T is the first period of the game; period t follows period t+ 1. To specify
the equilibrium, we need to specify the actions of the secondary user and the primary user
in all periods and after all possible values of histories and beliefs. Note that if g21 < g
∗, the
primary user always spreads its power. So we need to specify the action of the primary user
for the case when g21 > g
∗; we refer to this type of primary user as a high-gain primary user.
For the remainder of this discussion, we only specify the actions of the high-gain primary
user. (We ignore the g21 = g
∗ case since channel gains have continuous densities). Also
note that although the beliefs of the secondary user are history dependent, we suppress the
history dependence of the beliefs for notational simplicity.
• Period 1: In period 1 (which is the last period), if the secondary user does not enter,
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the high-gain primary user has no action to take. However, if the secondary user
decides to enter, the high-gain primary user will share the subchannels, since sharing
the subchannels is the best response of the high-gain primary user to an entry by
the secondary user. To decide between entry and exit, the secondary user takes into
account its belief µ2,1 about the channel gain g21 of the primary user. The secondary
user will enter if its expected payoff in period 1 is greater than its payoff if it exits.
This happens if
µ2,1(Π
spread
2 − kP ) + (1− µ2,1)(Π
share
2 − kP ) > 0 =⇒ µ2,1 <
Πshare2 − kP
Πshare2 −Π
spread
2
= d.
(18)
Here d is defined as in (8). Thus, in equilibrium the secondary user enters (N) if its
current belief µ2,1 < d, it exits the system if µ2,1 > d, and it is indifferent if µ2,1 = d.
To find the current belief µ2,1, the secondary user observes the history of the play. If
in period 2, the secondary user exits the game (X), no new information about the
primary user is learned. Thus if h = (X), we have µ2,1 = µ2,2. Since at period 2, no
history has been observed, we have µ2,2 = ρ, which is the initial belief of the secondary
user. However, if the secondary user in period 2 enters, the belief of the secondary user
in period 1 would depend upon the action taken by the primary user in period 2. If
the primary user shares the subchannels in period 1, then it is certain that g21 > g
∗
and hence µ2,1 = 0.
When the history (N, SP ) is observed, the secondary user uses Bayes’ rule to update
its belief. Let γ denote the probability that the primary user would spread its power
even if g21 > g
∗. Then the total probability that the primary user would spread (in
period 2) is µ2,2 + (1 − µ2,2)γ. Bayes’ rule then implies that the belief in period 1 is
given as
µ2,1 =
µ2,2
µ2,2 + (1− µ2,2)γ
. (19)
Here the numerator is the probability that g21 < g
∗ in period 2.
• Period 2: For the high-gain primary user in period 2, the action it takes in this period
determines the history for period 1, and hence the action taken by the secondary user.
The high-gain primary user thus needs to conjecture the behavior of the secondary user
in period 1 to decide its action. Note that the belief of the secondary user in period 2
25
is same as the initial belief, i.e., µ2,2 = ρ.
If the secondary user does not enter the game at this period, the primary user has no
action to take. However, if the secondary user enters, the high-gain primary user has
to choose between the actions SH or SP . It chooses this action so as to maximize its
expected total payoff in the two periods. Here the expectation is over the randomness
in the action taken by the secondary user in period 18.
First note that in equilibrium γ > 0. To see this, let us assume otherwise, i.e., γ = 0.
This implies that in equilibrium, if the secondary user enters, the high-gain primary
user does not spread. Then the high-gain primary user’s total payoff in 2 periods is
2Πshare1 . However, if the high-gain primary user spreads in period 2, then the secondary
user in period 1 has µ2,1 = 1 (see (19)) and hence it does not enter. In this case, the total
payoff to the high-gain primary user is Πspread1 +Π0 which is greater than 2Π
share
1 since
g21 < 1. Hence the high-gain primary user has a profitable deviation in equilibrium
with γ = 0. Thus, in equilibrium γ > 0.
We consider two different cases. First suppose that µ2,2 = ρ ≥ d. In this case,
regardless of the strategy of the primary user in period 2, we have
µ2,1 > ρ ≥ d.
Hence, the secondary user in period 1 would not enter after seeing the history of
SP . So if the high-gain primary user in period 2 takes the action SP , the total
payoff is Πspread1 + Π0. On the other hand taking the action SH would cause the
secondary user in period 1 to enter, and hence the total payoff would be 2Πshare1 . Since
Πspread1 +Π0 > 2Π
share
1 , the best response for the high-gain primary user in period 2 (if
the secondary enters and ρ > d) is to spread the power.
The second case is when µ2,2 = ρ < d. In this case, we first note that γ < 1. If we
assume that γ = 1, then µ2,1 = µ2,2 < d and hence the secondary user in period 1
would always enter and the high-gain primary would spread (since γ = 1). But we
know that in period 1, the best response of the high-gain primary user to an entry
is to share. Hence γ < 1. This implies that if µ2,2 < d, then 0 < γ < 1. Thus the
high-gain primary user randomizes its policy over SP and SH . This is only possible if
the secondary user in period 1 also randomizes over entry and exit. Let us denote the
probability of secondary user entering in period 1 under these conditions as λ. Since
8We are assuming that secondary user 2 has already entered, so the only unknown factor is the action of
the secondary user in period 1.
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the high-gain primary user in period 2 is indifferent between spreading and sharing its
expected payoff in both cases is the same. This gives
Πspread1 + λ
(
Πshare1
)
+ (1− λ)Π0 = 2Π
share
1
=⇒ λ = 2−
Π0 − Π
spread
1
Π0 −Πshare1
.
Also, since the secondary user in period 1 is indifferent between entry and exit, its
belief is µ2,1 = d. This gives
µ2,2
µ2,2 + (1− µ2,2)γ
= d =⇒ γ =
µ2,2
(1− µ2,2)
1− d
d
.
To determine the action of secondary user at period 2, we note that if it exits its payoff
is 0. Now if µ2,2 = ρ ≥ d, the high-gain primary user spreads with probability 1, hence
the best response for the secondary user is to exit. However, if µ2,2 = ρ < d, then the
secondary user’s expected payoff is
(Πspread2 )(ρ+ (1− ρ)γ) + (1− ρ)(1 − γ)Π
share
2 .
If the above expected payoff is less than 0, the secondary user does not enter. Using
the value of γ from above we get that if ρ > d2, the secondary user exits. However,
if ρ < d2, the secondary user enters, and at equality the secondary user is indifferent.
This completely specifies the sequential equilibrium for the two period repeated SBGI-
E game.
The extension to an arbitrary finite horizon repeated game is similar to the arguments
given above and we refer the reader to [7] for the detailed proof.
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Figure 1: Two User Interference Channel
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Figure 2: Convergence of best response dynamics for two user UC-GI game. We consider a
model with B = 2 sub channels, P = 1, N0 = 0.01, and we normalize g11 = g22 = 1. We
assume g12 and g21 are both drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We initiate the best
response dynamics at P11 = 1 − P12 = P , and P21 = 1 − P22 = 0; observe that the powers
Pic converge to P/2 for each i and c. The behavior is symmetric if we instead initiate with
P11 = 1− P12 = 0, and P21 = 1− P22 = P .
29
(a) (b)
PSfrag replacements
X N
SHSH
SHSHSH
SH
SP
SP
SP
SP
SP
SP
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
Figure 3: Game trees for sequential games. Player 1 is the primary user; player 2 is the
secondary user. The tree in (a) describes the SBGI game. The tree in (b) describes the
SBGI-E game.
30
